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 In the US, at the end of 2010 Congress extended the 
ethanol tax credit (VEETC) of $0.45/gal. for one year with 
the clear message to the industry and lobby groups that it 
wanted a long-term solution to be passed and implemented 
by the end of 2011.  Following are some of the policy 
options that are being considered in 2011: 
 
• Continue the 45 cent/gallon subsidy and the import 
tariff as at present 
• Shift the subsidy from blender to biofuel producer 
• Subsidy that varies with the price of crude oil or 
gasoline 
• Subsidy based at least in part on performance in 
reducing GHG 
• Subsidy based on energy content of the biofuel 
• Subsidy that is applied only for the quantity of biofuel 
in excess of the RFS 
• Eliminate the subsidy and the import tariff, and use 
funds for other purposes 
• Combinations of these options 
 
 We will describe and discuss the pros and cons of each 
of these options in turn below.  However, before the one by 
one explanation, it is useful to indicate that the Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS2) and the blend wall are the driving 
forces in the biofuels market today. The blend wall is due to 
the 10 percent ethanol blend used in the U.S. today [1].  We 
consume about 138 billion gallons of gasoline type fuel 
annually. Ten percent of that would be 13.8 billion gallons, 
but we cannot blend 10 percent everywhere and throughout 
the year for a number of reasons. Our estimate of the 
effective blend wall is about 12.5 billion gallons. Production 
in 2010 was higher, but the U.S. exported an estimated 350 
million gallons in 2010 [2]. EPA announced that they would 
approve an expansion of the blend percentage from 10 to 
15 percent but only for automotive vehicles built since 2001 
and excluding motorcycles, lawn mowers, marine engines, 
and other small engines. It is unclear if EPA will be able to 
implement the higher blending percentage and even if they 
do, to what extent the industry will adopt it. So long as the 
blending percentage stays at 10 percent, the blend wall is 
the major issue for the ethanol industry. The only way 
around that limit would be to rapidly grow the E85 market, 
but for a number of reasons, that will be very difficult to do in 
the short run [3].  To be competitive with E10, E85 must be 
priced  at 78%  of E10 or  less.  If E10 retails  for $3.50, E85  
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would have to retail for $2.73 or less to be 
economically competitive. That is difficult to do 
when the wholesale costs for gasoline and ethanol 
are in this range as they were in March 2011. 
Given the overshadowing importance of the blend 
wall, the policy option that is adopted for the 
subsidy does not matter as much because the 
operative constraint is the blend limit. However, if 
we are developing policy for the longer term, it is 
important to understand well the various options. 
Bearing this in mind, we will review the 
consequences of the different policy options that 
have been proposed. 
 
Continue the Status quo 
 
 Perhaps the greatest barrier to this option is the 
federal government budget cost.  At 2011 blending 
levels, the cost would be about $5.8 billion per 
year. When Congress is looking everywhere for 
cuts, this one may become a target, especially 
given that with the blend wall in effect, not much of 
the subsidy reaches the ethanol producer.  Most of 
the subsidy is divided between the ethanol blender 
and the consumer in the form of lower E10 prices 
[1].   
 
 Maintaining the ethanol tariff also would 
continue to displease Brazil, even though exports 
in 2010 were miniscule. Brazil is producing more 
sugar and less ethanol as world sugar prices have 
surged. So currently they export little ethanol, but 
would want to be in a position to resume exports 
again once world market conditions change.   
 
 Maintaining the subsidy, if the blend wall is 
relaxed, also would help keep corn prices high, 
which is supported by corn farmers but not by 
livestock producers or the food production and 
distribution industries. 
 
Switch to a Producer Subsidy instead of a 
Blender Tax Credit 
 
 As indicated above, currently the VEETC 
(blenders’ credit) is not reaching the ethanol 
producer as it has in the past, due mainly to the 
blend wall. Ethanol producers believe that 
switching to a refundable producer credit would 
change that to insure that producers did get the 
credit. The credit would probably need to be 
refundable because many ethanol producers might 
not have enough tax liability to absorb the entire 
amount of the credit. With this change, the 
producers would receive the credit, but it is not at 
all clear that they would be able to keep it, as the 
ethanol price would be determined by supply and 
demand forces in the market place. Those same 
supply and demand forces would be operative 
whether the credit is initially received by the 
ethanol blender or the ethanol producer. Thus what 
appears on the surface to be an improvement for 
the producer likely would result in no change. 
 
 In addition, if the switch were made to the 
ethanol producer, a way would have to be found to 
prevent the ethanol that received the subsidy from 
being exported. Administratively, it might be 
difficult to control the movement of the ethanol 
once it left the production facility. 
 
Subsidy that Varies with the Price of Crude 
Oil or Gasoline 
 
 Tyner and others have introduced a biofuel 
subsidy that varies with the price of crude oil or 
gasoline [1]. In this proposal, there is a price of 
crude oil (or gasoline) at which the subsidy begins, 
say $90/bbl., and a rate of change of the subsidy. If 
the start point were $90 crude oil, there would be 
no biofuel subsidy when crude oil is over that price. 
When crude oil is below that price, the subsidy 
would be equal to ($90 – Pc)*C.  So if crude oil 
were $50 and the rate of change 0.015, then the 
subsidy would be 60 cents per gallon. This system 
is designed to provide a safety net for ethanol 
producers when crude oil prices are lower without 
providing the subsidy when crude oil prices are 
high. In terms of operation, the subsidy would 
probably change each quarter, with the subsidy in 
quarter two being based on the average crude oil 
(or gasoline) price in quarter one. Thus, the 
subsidy would always be based on crude oil or 
gasoline prices lagged one quarter. It also could be 
done on a monthly basis, but the added 
administrative cost probably would exceed the gain 
from a more frequent change. 
 
 Another variant that has been proposed is that 
the subsidy would vary with the difference between 
the ethanol and gasoline wholesale prices [4]. 
Under this proposal, the subsidy would be equal to 
the difference between ethanol and gasoline prices 
up to the max level of $0.45. If the difference were 
negative (gasoline greater than ethanol), the 
subsidy would be zero. Thus the subsidy would be
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zero for much of the time since the norm is that 
gasoline is greater than ethanol. This alternative 
could work in the absence of the blend wall. 
However, with the binding blend wall, ethanol is 
priced on corn, not on gasoline. Between March 
and October 2010, the correlation between weekly 
corn and ethanol prices was $0.98. If corn price 
goes up, ethanol price goes up. With constant 
gasoline price, a variable subsidy based on the 
ethanol/gasoline margin would have the subsidy 
increasing as corn price increased, increasing the 
incentive to produce and increasing corn demand. 
 
 In the case with no blend wall, ethanol regains 
its price relationship with gasoline. That is, there is 
a high correlation between gasoline and ethanol 
price. While there might be short-term fluctuations, 
with no blend wall the prices have moved closely 
together. In that event, this ethanol/gasoline 
difference based subsidy remains essentially a 
fixed subsidy since the two prices move together. 
What may make the gasoline – ethanol spread 
seem attractive is that in the past couple of years, 
we have moved between an ethanol price based 
on gasoline to one based on corn. The point here 
is that there are problems with the price spread 
approach whichever regime plays out in the future, 
the spread approach does not function as 
envisioned in many circumstances. 
 
 Some have argued that the subsidy should be 
based on the ethanol/corn spread as is done in 
California [4]. That could work for a small part of 
the total market, but if it covered the national 
market, it would provide a strong incentive to 
expand production. The ethanol corn/spread goes 
down, the subsidy goes up, which increases the 
incentive to produce, which increases the corn 
price, which decreases the ethanol/corn spread, 
and the cycle continues. At a national level, over 
time this approach would result in the max subsidy 
permitted under the system, and would provide 
added pressure on corn prices. 
 
 Also, while public reliable data is available on 
gasoline (RBOB) and crude oil (NYMEX or WTI), 
the same is not true for ethanol. There is lots of 
regional variability in the ethanol market. So even 
constructing the margin could prove problematic. 
 
 Another possibility would be to base the credit 
on crude oil futures prices rather than current 
market prices. That could be done, but would not 
change the levels much as the market and near 
futures prices contain very similar information. That 
is, there is a high correlation between near term 
futures and current market prices. 
 
 One impact of the variable subsidy option that 
would need to be considered is the effect on RIN 
markets. In the early phases of implementation of 
this system, there could be some disruption in the 
RIN markets as market players learned how to 
adjust to the new ground rules. However, after an 
adjustment period, the RIN markets likely would 
function efficiently under a subsidy that varied with 
the price of crude or gasoline. 
 
Subsidy Based in Part on Performance in 
Reducing GHG 
 
 One of the national objectives in promoting 
renewable fuels is to reduce GHG emissions. This 
proposal focuses on that objective in that it 
rewards ethanol plants to the extent that they 
reduce GHG emissions. Essentially, the subsidy 
would be divided into two parts: 1) a fixed 
component, say 20 cents per gallon, and 2) a 
component that would be a function of the extent to 
which each ethanol plant reduced GHG emissions. 
The fixed component either could be a fixed 
amount per gallon of biofuel or a fixed amount per 
energy unit of biofuel produced. That is, it could be 
volume or energy content based. Implementing this 
option would require a means of certifying the 
carbon footprint for each ethanol facility. In 
essence, this certification would require estimation 
of the total GHG for the plant from the farm through 
the ethanol consumption, as would be required to 
obtain certification for a non-default number for the 
California Low Carbon Fuel Standard. 
Alternatively, it could be based on the GHG 
footprint for the conversion facility alone. The 
advantage of this approach is that at least part of 
the subsidy would be “pay for performance” and 
would provide an incentive for plants to reduce 
their carbon footprint. A disadvantage would be 
that it might be costly to certify the carbon footprint 
for each plant and to repeat the certification each 
time the plant made investments to reduce its 
carbon footprint. We would need to get a good idea 
of how large this cost would be to ascertain the 
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Subsidy Based on the Energy Content of 
the Biofuel 
 
 At present both the corn ethanol subsidy of 
$0.45/gal. and the cellulose biofuel subsidy of 
$1.01/gal. are solely based on the volume of 
biofuel produced with no reference to the amount 
of energy produced. Particularly for the cellulosic 
biofuel, the volumetric basis for the subsidy favors 
biofuels like ethanol with a relatively low energy 
content because they receive a higher subsidy per 
unit of energy. The amount of foreign oil displaced 
depends on the energy content of the biofuel. A 
subsidy that is based on energy content is 
considered technology neutral. That is, the signal it 
sends is that the government wants to encourage 
renewable energy production and leaves it to the 
private sector to determine the most economical 
way to produce BTUs of renewable energy. For 
example, if we take the $1.01/gal. current subsidy 
for cellulosic biofuel and say that is pegged to bio-
gasoline, then a gallon of cellulosic ethanol would 
receive a subsidy of $0.67, and a gallon of 
cellulosic diesel would receive a subsidy of about 
$1.14. So instead of subsidizing a volume of 
biofuel, this approach would subsidize biofuels 
based on their energy content. It levels the playing 
field among the different competing biofuel 
technologies. The Renewable Fuel Standard 
already takes this approach in that the RINs a 
biofuel receives are based on the energy content 
of the biofuel. 
 
Subsidy Available only to the Quantity of 
Biofuel in Excess of the RFS 
 
 Many economists have argued that under 
certain circumstances the subsidy is redundant if 
we have a binding RFS mandate [5-7]. This 
alternative makes the subsidy available only to the 
quantity of biofuel blended (or produced, 
depending on where the subsidy is applied) in 
excess of the RFS. This option would substantially 
reduce the government budget cost of the subsidy 
as only the biofuel blended in excess of the RFS 
would receive the subsidy. According to the 
Renewable Fuel Association, we will have in 2012 
14.6 billion gallons of ethanol production capacity, 
and the 2012 RFS for corn ethanol is 13.2 billion 
gallons. If all the capacity were used for domestic 
markets, the subsidy under this proposal would 
only apply to 1.4 billion gallons instead of the entire 
14.6 billion, thereby saving $5.9 billion at the 
current subsidy rate. 
 
 This policy option would have no impact on 
corn demand relative to the current policy. Thus, 
whatever pressure exists on corn prices from the 
current policy would continue under this 
alternative. 
 
 The main impact of this policy would be in the 
RIN markets, and it would be complicated because 
there are unique RINs for each category of biofuels 
in the RFS. The proposed mechanism for 
implementing this option is through the RIN 
system. The blender would receive a tax credit for 
any RIN submitted beyond their blending 
obligation. For the conventional biofuels category, 
if a blender knows that they will receive 45 cents 
per gallon for every gallon blended beyond the 
RFS, then the RIN value, perhaps especially 
towards the end of the year, would approach 45 
cents. Historically, RIN prices have been much 
lower than that. 
 
 There would also be complicated 
implementation and enforcement issues. RINs are 
administered by the EPA, and the blender’s tax 
credit is administered by the IRS.  So the EPA and 
IRS would have to coordinate carefully. In addition, 
since the VEETC is applicable to blenders, and 
“obligated parties” under the RFS2 are sometimes 
blenders and sometimes refiners or others, it could 
be very complicated to implement a system under 
this proposal that could function effectively. 
 
Eliminate the Subsidy and Import Tariff and 
Use the Resources to Expand Demand 
 
 This option would phase out the subsidy and 
import tariff but retain the equivalent amount of 
government resources to subsidize expansion of 
blender pumps, E85 pumps, and other 
infrastructure. A common perception in industry is 
that much of the current subsidy is not reaching 
ethanol producers and that given the blend wall, 
the bigger problem is expanding ethanol demand. 
Thus, this approach argues for using government 
resources to help create the infrastructure needed 
for E85 and other blends. As Tyner et al. have 
documented [3], the amount of investment needed 
to create the infrastructure is large, and this policy 
approach is designed to get the investment 
moving. 




 Perhaps the biggest problem with this option is 
that even if the infrastructure exists, the price of 
E85 would have to be competitive with E10 to get 
consumers to purchase E85. As indicated earlier, if 
the retail price of E10 is $3.50, E85 would have to 
be $2.73 or lower to entice consumers to purchase 
E85. It is not at all clear that E85 can be produced 
and marketed for 78% of the price of E10, which is 
what would be needed. Some argue that if the 
infrastructure exits, oil companies would be forced 
to cross-subsidize E85 because they would have 
to meet the RFS levels that rise to 15 bil. gal. in 
2015. The market might eventually evolve that 
way, but it is likely to be slow to get going. 
 
Combinations of the Options 
 
 Some of these options could be combined to 
produce hybrid alternatives. For example, the 
energy based approach could be used along with a 
variable subsidy or along with the two part subsidy 
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